OCCUPY WALL STREET TEN YEARS ON:
HOW ITS DISRUPTIVE INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP SPREAD
AND WHY IT FIZZLED

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ABSTRACT
How does media impact institutional entrepreneurs and their ability to create change? We draw from research on social movements and media frames to examine the paradox that media-informed discursive opportunities pose for institutional entrepreneurs engaged in efforts to transform or create social institutions. Through content analysis of 8,473 newspaper articles covering the 2011 Occupy Wall Street movement, we highlight the paradox of discursive opportunities: the same types of media frames that initially encourage more disruptive tactics also subsequently increase the perceived threat of such disruption, thereby encouraging swifter counteraction. Our findings hold implications for the importance of media as a potential catalyst for entrepreneurial activity in the realm of social movements hoping to engage in reform.

1. Introduction

Ten years ago, the Occupy Wall Street social movement spread rapidly to hundreds of locations before collapsing. The Occupy social movement sought social change through institutional entrepreneurship (Kury, 2012). With the benefit of historical perspective, recent studies have begun to draw insights from this movement (Reinecke and Ansari, 2021). We build on this renewed interest (Johnson et al., 2021), conducting an event history content analysis of media influences on institutional entrepreneurs’ social movement tactics. We examine two unanswered questions, each of which has implications for how institutional entrepreneurs rally support for their endeavors: why did Occupy’s brand of institutional entrepreneurship spread so rapidly and why did it fail?

Institutional entrepreneurs must rally supporters and marshal resources in order to transform existing institutions or create new ones resulting in social change (Dean and McMullen, 2007; Logue and Grimes, 2019). A key influence on entrepreneurs’ ability to do this are media-informed discursive opportunities (i.e., moments when cultural discourse is favorably aligned with proposals for change; Gehman and Soubliere, 2017; Lounsbury and Glynn, 2001). These discursive opportunities are informed by media frames (e.g., Hiatt et al., 2009): rhetoric that identifies, labels, and interprets social events and circumstances (Cornelissen and Werner,
Although social movements are thought to take part in diffusing new frames and cultural products that are supportive of the aims of those movements (Vasi et al., 2015), social scientists have consistently argued that the traditional media mediates any impact of those movements’ frames, given its continued dominant role in socially constructing modern reality (Gamson et al., 1992; McCombs and Shaw, 1972).

While discursive opportunities allow change agents to mobilize supporters and thus affect social change (Dorobantu et al., 2017; McCammon et al., 2007), such opportunities, as constructed by media frames, may also make counteraction by incumbent forces more likely (e.g., Waldron et al., 2013). As such, our view is that while media-informed discursive opportunities encourage mobilization, they paradoxically affect counter-mobilization, potentially confounding an otherwise clear relationship between discursive opportunities and institutional entrepreneurship. If this is true, it has broad relevance to the growing number of disruptive innovations that challenge existing institutions (e.g., cryptocurrency).

We study the U.S. Occupy movement, totaling 436 sites and conducting a hierarchical event history analysis of the influence of 8,473 media articles across up to 72,281 days of time-to-event data. Our longitudinal data allow us to examine whether media-informed discursive opportunities help explain the spread and collapse of Occupy over and above the influence of time and other factors known to influence diffusion in social movements (Strang and Soule, 1998). Like other social movements, the Occupy movement sought to alter social norms and influence government action and legislation (e.g., Meek et al., 2010; Pacheco et al., 2010a). Occupy is a particularly interesting venue for understanding the relationship between discursive opportunities and institutional entrepreneurship because despite similar objectives and organizational structures, some sites were able to mobilize supporters toward more disruptive forms of institutional entrepreneurship (e.g., trespassing and permanent encampment) than others (e.g., meetings and temporary protests). Occupy also allows us to study how discursive opportunities subsequently affect the speed of counteraction (i.e., shutting down an encampment), as governments reacted differently to similar sites.
Our insight is that there is indeed a paradox in how media-informed discursive opportunities enable institutional entrepreneurship. Discursive opportunities both lead to more disruptive approaches to institutional entrepreneurship and also increase the perceived threat posed by such efforts to the status quo, thus encouraging swifter counteraction.

2. Discourse analysis of Occupy movement

The discourse surrounding social movement dynamics is often contentious as supporters, opponents, and third parties offer and attempt to diffuse new frames (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012; Meyer and Höllerer, 2010). Frames are rhetoric that serves to shape the understanding or interpretation of events and circumstances (Cornelissen and Werner, 2014; Goffman, 1974). Together, the frames applied to an event can form a discursive opportunity for collective action (Benford and Snow, 2000; Hiatt et al., 2009). Such opportunities can be seized by institutional entrepreneurs to affect social change through social movements.

While the leaders of social movements seek to shape and diffuse new, favorable frames, traditional media plays a dominant role, operating as an exogenous force, bearing heavily both on movements’ agendas as well as on their capacity to affect change (Briscoe and Murphy, 2012; Rao et al., 2010; Vasi et al., 2015; Zietsma and Lawrence, 2010). Thus, we argue that media-informed discursive opportunities affect whether extra-institutional entrepreneurs recognize local opportunities for influencing social change and the means by which social movements acting as extra-institutional entrepreneurs choose to exploit such opportunities. Additionally, we argue that media-informed discursive opportunities also influence the speed of counteraction in response to institutional entrepreneurs’ disruptive actions in seeking social change.

The media is often thought to assist in diffusing stakeholder reactions to critical events, thereby reflecting public opinion climates (Dorobantu et al., 2017). This reflection can then take the form of “social proof,” where opinions and reactions begin to cascade, mobilizing individuals in support of or against a particular cause (Dorobantu et al., 2017; Rao et al., 2001). Thus, media framing of events can create media-informed discursive opportunities. These emerge when the relative composition of positive media sentiment regarding a social movement and its grievances
outweighs related negative sentiment (Deephouse, 2000). As such, higher levels of expressed support for the movement or the proposed institutional changes can encourage actors to engage in further similar change efforts, as they perceive cultural opportunities for doing so (Dorobantu et al., 2017; Geels and Verhees, 2011; Turró et al., 2014). Alternatively, when the media criticizes the movement, its agenda, and activities, this can serve to obstruct the emergence and diffusion of such activities (Shriver et al., 2013).

Beyond the relative composition of negative to positive sentiment expressed by the media, discursive opportunities are also likely informed by how the media chooses to frame the collective action in terms of its degree of disruption. Specifically, media coverage that focuses on the disruptive aspects of the movement will increase public awareness of the actors, activities and the causes that compelled such activities (McLeod et al., 1991). For individuals who are already sympathetic to the need for disruption, framing the disruptive nature of the movement tends to encourage participation (Dorobantu et al., 2017).

The Occupy movement, which began on September 17, 2011 in Zuccotti Park some 450 feet from its eponymous street (Bennett, 2011) is a strong example of how the relative composition of negative to positive sentiment and the relative frequency of media frames focused on a movement’s disruptive potential can contribute to whether local institutional entrepreneurs exploit a discursive opportunity. First-hand scholarly accounts of the movement suggest that the activists and social movement leaders relied on traditional media sources to report on public opinion and inform their tactical decisions (Gould-Wartofsky, 2015; Reinecke and Ansari, 2021). Initially, external media sources amplified public opinions of the movement and the movement’s grievances, thereby playing an essential role in diffusing the Occupy movement. At times, the media merely reported on the tactics of the various sites, but frequently these reports were accompanied by positive or negative language that framed those tactics. For instance, early media reports from the New York Times of the initial Wall Street site characterized the protests as noble and comprised of “rightly frustrated young people”, yet also called it a “fractured and airy movement” with causes that were “impossible to decipher”
Bellafante, 2011). Such mixed media sentiment continued throughout the lifecycle of the U.S. encampments and protest sites. It is our view that both positive versus negative framing as well as the relative frequency of media frames focused on Occupy’s disruptive potential were positive influences on whether a nascent Occupy site in a new city chose to take the next step and organize an encampment.

We are also interested in understanding what influenced the failures of those encampments. We begin by pointing out that the creation of an encampment influences the likelihood of counteraction. This is consistent with the prevailing social movements literature which suggests that authorities’ responses to threats are a function of the threatening characteristics of the movement or its tactics (Hiatt et al., 2015). For instance, McAdam (1996: 341) notes that, "the tactics and goals of the movement largely shape the reaction of various publics to the conflict.” For example, Earl and colleagues (2003) report that police presence at protests can largely be attributed to the confrontational nature of the movement tactics employed: sit-ins and occupations engender greater response, peaceful marches less response.

Although the behaviors of institutional entrepreneurs may indeed influence counteraction, such differences may not explain all of the observed variance, given anecdotal evidence of different counteractive responses to the same disruptive activity. For example, Airbnb and its founders have long engaged in institutional entrepreneurship, challenging existing institutions in service of legitimizing “the sharing economy” (Zervas et al., 2017). In this role, Airbnb has uniformly threatened large hospitality organizations as well as existing legislation. “Despite Airbnb’s growing popularity, many Airbnb rentals are actually illegal due to short-term rental regulations,” (Guttentag, 2015). Despite this, many municipalities decided to relax local enforcement of such laws, while others have been much swifter and forceful in their reaction. In this case, market behaviors remained constant, but the municipalities’ perceived threat of the behaviors varied. The same is true of Occupy and municipalities perceptions of its threat.

Our view is that perception of Occupy as a threat (proxied by the breaking-up/eviction of encampments) will be influenced by the creation of discursive opportunities by media. The
creation of such opportunities is a function of two forms of media framing: the relative composition of negative to positive sentiment and the relative frequency of media frames focused on the disruptive potential of a particular occupation. Each will make counteraction more likely: where media ignores the occupation, so will local governments. This allows the occupation to remain and continue to work to capture public support, whether directly or through the media. On the other hand, where media frames position the entrepreneur as a credible threat to the status quo, counteraction will be more likely and more rapid. Specifically, because responses to social movements are dependent on the degree of perceived threat (King, 2008; King and Soule, 2007; McDonnell and King, 2013), we expect that differences in media frames will influence the degree to which a given occupation is seen as a threat deserving of counteraction (Kennedy, 2008). We thus expect that the relative strength of positive to negative media sentiment will accelerate counteraction against institutional entrepreneurs. Further, media coverage which highlights the occupation’s disruptive potential will also make counteraction more likely and more rapid.

Our research questions require us to examine whether current media frames are associated with future events of interest (encampments and counteraction). Answering these requires an event history approach and longitudinal data. Event history analysis is a branch of survival analysis used in studies of social movements, the effects of protests, the diffusion and acceptance of practices, and in general, influences on whether an event occurs (i.e., encampment or counteraction; see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 1997; King and Soule, 2007). Event history is required for our study because it allows us to estimate the probability that an Occupy site will encamp (or that an encampment will be subject to counteraction), given the influence of the media frames from a given city, published at multiple points in time. It is important to account for time because Occupy sites will naturally be more likely to establish in other cities soon after the formation of Occupy Wall Street. Explicitly including time in our models allows us to examine whether media frames have any additional explanatory power, above the known influence of time on the diffusion of social movements.
We began data collection with a list of all U.S. Occupy sites, whose selection we describe in Appendix A, which also provides additional detail on our data, procedures, and methods. In total we identified 436 distinct Occupy sites. For each, we identified if the site ever formed a disruptive encampment, and if so, the date on which this occurred. Next, for sites which formed encampments (165), we identified whether government representatives caused a forced departure, and if so, the date on which this occurred.

We measure our media frame variables, relative strength of positive to negative media sentiment and media coverage which highlights the occupation’s disruptive potential, using validated computer-aided text analysis dictionaries (e.g., Allison et al., 2013) on news articles covering specific Occupy movement locations (e.g., Deephouse, 1996; Dorobantu et al., 2017). Content analysis of media is a valuable method for generating site-specific measures of public endorsement or disapproval, because it allows longitudinal analyses (Vergne, 2011). All articles were collected using LexisNexis Academic. We performed an exhaustive search for all articles referencing any Occupy site. The search criterion was the name of the organization: for example, Occupy Cleveland. We matched articles to Occupy sites according to the geographic area covered by the media outlet. For each matched article, we retained those articles published on a date prior to the date our outcomes of interest occurred (Occupy site establishes encampment or encampment forced to depart). We additionally included national media coverage on the broader Occupy movement, given the impact of such media frames on all Occupy sites. Eliminating duplicates yielded 8,473 articles. Our resulting data includes local coverage of local events and local coverage of national events. For example, the Spokesman Review (Goodman, 2011) on 23 September, 2011 wrote approvingly of the march on Wall Street: “2,000 people did occupy Wall Street last Saturday...their message was clear: ‘We are the 99 percent that will no longer tolerate the greed and corruption of the 1 percent.’” An occupation began in Spokane six days later.

Our content analysis software is Harvard General Inquirer. This software and its dictionaries have been developed and validated in organizational and sociological research over many years (Stone et al., 1966). To measure the balance of positive to negative media frames, we
follow previous research that relies on Harvard’s General Inquirer’s Positive and Negative Outlook dictionaries to measure positive/negative evaluations (e.g., Abrahamson and Fairchild, 1999). The Positive and Negative outlook dictionaries are combined into a single media sentiment measure using the content analysis coefficient of imbalance (Janis and Fadner, 1943; Soroka et al., 2015). Overall positivity/negativity is scaled to [-1,1] such that purely negative press is coded as -1, purely positive press is coded as 1, and a mixture of both falls between those points (e.g., Deephouse, 2000). Because we are concerned with the accumulation of positive and negative frames regarding the Occupy encampments, our positive-negative frame imbalance variable reflects the cumulative balance of positive and negative frames articulated from the first day of observation to each day at risk of both encampment and forced dissolution (Appendix A provides further details). We are also concerned with differences in media frames regarding the disruptive potential of Occupy sites. Disruptive potential is a function of the social movement’s ability to induce conflict in discourse about who the legitimate holders of political power are. The Harvard General Inquirer program includes a dictionary to capture discourse indicating power conflict in media discourse, the Power Conflict dictionary. This dictionary is defined as capturing “words for ways of conflicting,” within the sphere of power, which is “influence to affect the policies of others” (Namenwirth and Weber, 2016). Thus, this dictionary was used to measure power conflict frames (e.g., Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2011). To control for the fact that some sites have more news reported about them in general, we divided the daily observation of power conflict by the total number of words. Then, to capture the cumulative effect of power conflict language, each day’s power conflict score is aggregated as the sum from the first day of observation to the focal day. Table 1 presents examples of positive media frames, negative media frames, and media frames with prominent power conflict frames. We include five sets of controls in our analyses in order to isolate the effects of media frames on the formation of and counteraction against Occupy encampments. These are shown in Table 2: social media effects, ideological effects, diffusion effects, community characteristic effects, and encampment condition effects.
3. Results

We use a shared frailty estimator. This random effects (hierarchical) model allows us to tie together all observations associated with the same encampment site. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3. The results of our event history analyses are presented in Table 4. In the first two models, we examined media’s effects on the Occupy sites’ degree of disruption. Model 1 presents controls only. In Model 2, we found that positive-negative frame imbalance (hazard ratio = 10.20; p < 0.01) and power conflict frames (hazard ratio = 1.13; p < 0.01) increased the probability of an encampment being established. As these hazard ratios are proportional, they indicate that a one unit change in positive-negative frame imbalance (i.e., from 75% negative/25% positive (-0.5) to 25% negative/75% positive (0.5)) results in a more than ten-fold increase (10.2 times) in the odds of an encampment being formed by local organizers in the future. Similarly, for every unit change in power conflict frames, the odds of an encampment being formed in the next event history period are increased 1.13 times.

Thus, consistent with the view that media frames are influential in shaping events (e.g., Earl et al., 2004), these results provide support for the idea that both the relative composition of negative to positive frames and the relative frequency of media frames focused on Occupy’s disruptive potential contribute to whether local institutional entrepreneurs perceive a discursive opportunity to be exploited by organizing an encampment and mobilizing supporters to fund and staff that encampment.

Turning to our forced departure predictions, Models 3 and 4 examined media frames’ effects on the rate of counteraction against nonconformity. In Model 3, we provide a baseline analysis consisting of all control variables. In Model 4, we found that positive-negative frame imbalance (hazard ratio = 19.45; p < 0.10) did not significantly increase the hazard of an
encampment being forced to depart at the 0.05 p-value cutoff. However, power conflict frames (hazard ratio = 1.03; p < 0.01) did significantly increase the hazard of an encampment being forced to depart. Thus, we find that media power conflict frames makes eviction more likely, while the positive-negative frame balance did not. Power conflict frames increase the odds of forced departure in the next day by 3% for every unit change in power conflict frames. As this is a daily effect, this is substantial.

These results provide partial support for our suggestion that media frames play a role in how governments and authorities perceive threats, consistent with the view that responses to social movements vary depending on perceived threat (King, 2008; King and Soule, 2007; McDonnell and King, 2013). Specifically, we find that power conflict media frames may influence the degree to which a given occupation is seen as a threat deserving of counteraction (Kennedy, 2008). Our results suggest weak significance for an effect of positive frame imbalance on the perceived threat of an occupation.

4. Discussion: Bridging research on institutional entrepreneurship and entrepreneurship

The most consequential contemporary examples of innovation (e.g., sharing economy, digital currency, alternative energy, microfinance) are those which involve not only the introduction of new organizations but also the uprooting or reform of existing institutions (Grimes et al., 2018; Khavul et al., 2013; York et al., 2016). Given the seeming increased potential for commercial entrepreneurs to simultaneously act as institutional entrepreneurs this intersection seems more critical than ever. In this study, we have explored this intersection, investigating how discursive opportunities affect not only the actions of institutional entrepreneurs, but also the counteractions taken against institutional entrepreneurs. We suggest that for scholars seeking to understand the ability for change agents to disrupt the status quo, this illustrates a way to learn from longstanding empirical evidence regarding the emergence, mobilization, and success of social movements as analogues for understanding entrepreneurship.

We found that the same types of discursive opportunities that encouraged the mobilization of institutional entrepreneurship toward more disruptive actions also increased the
perceived threat of such mobilization, speeding up counteraction. Specifically, we found that media that focused on the conflicts instigated by the movement increased the speed with which authorities evicted encampments. Our findings challenge narrow conceptions of entrepreneurial opportunities by highlighting the importance of discursive opportunities (Lounsbury and Glynn, 2019) as well as the ways in which such opportunities not only encourage mobilization but also counter-mobilization. Our findings also challenge our understanding of the positive effects of media frames in the context of institutional entrepreneurship and innovation.

Many institutional entrepreneurs—like most entrepreneurs—have little a priori insight into the “market need” that might or might not exist for their proposals of change. Any such insight that they are able to obtain is shaped by the media they consume. Our findings thus highlight the agenda-setting role of media-informed discursive opportunities both for those who are seeking change and those who are resisting change. To the extent that any opportunities are created, this is accomplished by way of communications and narratives, which express some future possible solutions to current problems (Garud and Giuliani, 2013; Garud et al., 2014). To the extent that any opportunities exist apart from the entrepreneurs, this is because those communications about what is necessary and possible have become culturally legitimizened.

Our findings also lend insight into the challenges associated with disruptive innovations during an era of rampant media attention (Grimes and Vogus, 2021). Innovations such as these (e.g. cryptocurrency) challenge established institutional orders and thus, securing the success of disruptive innovations often involves institutional entrepreneurship. We suggest in this study that given the media’s power in shaping not only public discourse but also individual and collective action, entrepreneurs are well-advised to seek ways of bolstering media coverage of their ideas and innovations. Scholarly evidence has largely reinforced this conventional wisdom (Petkova et al., 2013; Pollock and Rindova, 2003). Yet our findings suggest that to the extent that entrepreneurs’ agendas for change are controversial, they may benefit much less from increased media coverage. Our findings thus surface the paradox of media coverage for controversial or disruptive innovations.
Our study should be understood relative to its limitations, some of which hold potential for future research. One of these concerns the media framing of non-text (multimedia) content. Content analysis has traditionally focused on text, but recent work has begun to expand to images, leading to insights about the persuasive influence of facial expressions (Davis et al., 2021; Warnick et al., 2021). Future entrepreneurship work on media frames may consider extending such content analysis approaches to media framing of photographs that accompany the text of stories.

In conclusion, we hope that our work will contribute to the growing body of research which has challenged entrepreneurship scholars to recognize cases in which attempts to found new ventures go hand in hand with attempts to create or change societal institutions (Alvarez et al., 2015; Gehman and Grimes, 2017; Khavul et al., 2013; Lee and Hung, 2014; Pacheco et al., 2010b). We suggest that consideration of institutional entrepreneurship will prove essential for fully understanding the entrepreneurial process and any associated outcomes.
References
Bennett, D., 2011. David Graeber, the Anti-Leader of Occupy Wall Street. Bloomberg Business Week, 26,


Table 1. Positive, Negative and Power Conflict Frame Exemplars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Exemplars</th>
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<tr>
<td>Positive frame</td>
<td>Today, our Constitution (article 1, section 21) declares, citizens have a right in a peaceable manner to assembly for their common good. While our federal free-speech rights may be limited by content-neutral regulations as to time, place and manner, and then only if such regulations are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, section 24 of the Rhode Island Constitution makes clear that rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States. Although Rhode Island courts have yet to hold that Rhode Island’s constitution provides protesters with more protection than the First Amendment, the history of Providence suggests that it should. Last Thursday, the City of Providence issued eviction notices to those occupying Burnside Park. The letters cite park rules and city ordinances prohibiting littering, alcohol, pets, and bullhorns all issues that Occupy Providence has studiously addressed. The park is cleaner and safer now than it has ever been. The Rhode Island chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union says Occupy Providence protesters have little legal grounds to support their right to remain encamped at a downtown park. Rhode Island ACLU Executive Director Steven Brown said Friday that a U.S. Supreme Court decision upholding camping bans in certain public parks “significantly limits” Occupy Providence's right to stay at Burnside Park indefinitely. Brown says the ACLU disagrees with the ruling. He called on local authorities to respect Occupy Providence's First Amendment right to engage in other forms of peaceful protest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power conflict</td>
<td>The local Veterans for Peace hold memorial services, including the recent ceremony of remembrance on Veterans Day at Mineral Palace Park. They try to educate the public by showing films and distributing copies of The War Crimes Times that’s published four times a year by the national Veterans for Peace organization. They’ve held protests here and joined ones in Colorado Springs. Lately, they’ve aligned themselves with Occupy Pueblo and the national Occupy Wall Street movement because, Butler says, “If you follow the money, a major factor in the economy’s collapse is the tremendous expenditure of our war economy. If you spend your money … it’s either for guns or butter. If you build a bridge, you have it for 30 years -- a good investment. If you bomb a bridge, and technically you’re supposed to rebuild it before you leave, you have to pay for the bombs and have to pay for the bridge and you have nothing to show for the expenditure, in this country.” Paulsen says: “It bothers me that the military-industrial complex runs this country.” The Occupy Wall Street protests are just another example of the divisions that plague our nation. We have a segment of society that is unwilling to accept any responsibility for their personal lack of success. They find it necessary and convenient to blame others, demand social justice, and engage in the political denigration of the greedy capitalists…Unfortunately political groups are using these protests as an opportunity to continue the constant bitter political social and economic mudslinging to divide rather than unite our nation. As soon as someone learns that they do not have economic social or political equality the volley of nasty bitter partisan attacks begin.</td>
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### Table 2. Control Variables

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Control category</th>
<th>Description of Controls</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Social media</strong></td>
<td>The Occupy movement relied heavily on social media to communicate with stakeholders (Costanza-Chock, 2012). Social media provides an efficient mechanism for soliciting potential participants to organize and engage in collective action (Segerberg and Bennett, 2011). Twitter was the primary platform used (in 2011, Facebook’s usage profile was significantly different than it is 10 years later (e.g., Nadkarni and Hofmann, 2012). Thus, to control for social media effects, we collected all Twitter posts associated with each Occupy site (e.g., Fischer and Reuber, 2014). We identified all versions of the Occupy site name in order to collect tweets that used short forms of the occupation name. Social media frames as a control is the number of tweets and retweets associated with each site from the first day of observation. We identified 2,069,408 tweets and 35,509,332 retweets. We further capture encampment tweets to address the extent to which each sites’ discussion of encamping may inform both media coverage and variance in the decision to encamp.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ideology</strong></td>
<td>Ideology provides the basis for institutional entrepreneurship (Zald, 1996). When individuals have affinity for the ideology of an institutional entrepreneur, they are more likely to mobilize (e.g., McAdam, 1986). Accordingly, we controlled for the effects of political ideology, the linear combination of “the outcomes of congressional elections, the partisan division of state legislatures, [and] the party of the governor” (Berry et al., 1998: 327) plus voting data for the political subdivision containing each Occupy organization for the most recent presidential election prior to the events of the study.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Diffusion</strong></td>
<td>Diffusion is the spread of institutional entrepreneurship within a population (e.g., Strang and Soule, 1998). By controlling for diffusion effects, we isolate non-framing influences. Proximity is one of the most commonly cited antecedents of diffusion (Strang and Soule, 1998). We controlled for proximity in two ways. First, we controlled for distance from Wall Street as the distance (miles) between an Occupy site and Zuccotti Park where the movement began. Second, we controlled for distance to the nearest neighboring Occupy site as the distance (miles) between an Occupy site and the nearest neighboring encampment. Nearest neighbors were those encampments existing or still existing on each day of the study period. Timing and momentum also influence diffusion (Strang and Soule, 1998). To address this concern, we controlled for both the number of encampments established on the previous day and the cumulative number of encampments established as of the previous day. Occupy had formal initiatives to initiate encampments on 10 and 15 October, 2011, thus, we also included two dichotomous controls to capture these events (lagged one day prior). To address timing in our study of encampment closures, we controlled for the number of encampments closed on the previous day and the cumulative number of encampments closed as of the previous day. Additionally, given the symbolic leadership (e.g., Ganz, 2000) of the encampment in Manhattan and its influence on whether other sites persisted, we controlled for whether this site was still encamped (dichotomous).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Community</strong></td>
<td>Characteristics of the community can also influence the spread and persistence of institutional entrepreneurship (e.g., Vigdor, 2004). Dense environments increase the opportunity for collective action (e.g., McVeigh, 1995). Accordingly, we control for population density (e.g., Sampson et al., 2005). We also control for whether the Occupy site was located in the state capital, coded as 1, or in a different city, coded as 0 (cf. McVeigh, 2006). Capital cities are more attractive for social activism (McVeigh, 2006). We further controlled for the number of colleges in the city associated with the Occupy site as identified by the U.S. Department of Education. We also controlled for the unemployment rate of the statistical area containing the Occupy site as well as the poverty rate of the county containing the Occupy site.</td>
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<td><strong>Encampment conditions</strong></td>
<td>Encampment conditions such as the weather are likely to influence the formation and persistence of encampments. Bad weather increases an individual’s costs of participating in collective action (Oberschall, 1980), making it less likely that they will participate in encampments. Accordingly, we control for the mean temperature (°F) and the daily precipitation (inches) as measured by local National Weather Service stations.</td>
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## Table 3. Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spread of Occupy Encampments</th>
<th>Eviction of Occupy Encampments</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variable</strong></td>
<td><strong>Mean</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Encampment</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Days to Encampment</td>
<td>117.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Positive-Negative Frame Imbalance</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Power Conflict Frames</td>
<td>15.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. ‘Encampment’ Tweets</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Social Media Frames</td>
<td>2383.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Political Ideology</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Number of Colleges</td>
<td>4.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Unemployment Rate</td>
<td>8.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Poverty Rate</td>
<td>14.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Distance from Wall Street</td>
<td>1291.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Distance to Nearest Neighbor</td>
<td>209.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Number of Encampments Established</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. October 10(^{th})</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. October 15(^{th})</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Population Density</td>
<td>663.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. State Capital</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Weather (Mean Temperature)</td>
<td>51.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Weather (Precipitation)</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 4. Event History Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DV: Encampment</th>
<th>DV: Forced Departure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Controls: Social Media</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Media Frames</td>
<td>1.00*** (+)</td>
<td>1.00*** (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Encampment’ Tweets</td>
<td>1.01*** (+)</td>
<td>1.00† (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Controls: Movement Ideology/Influences</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Ideology</td>
<td>5.74* (+)</td>
<td>2.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Colleges</td>
<td>1.09** (+)</td>
<td>1.08† (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate</td>
<td>0.47*** (−)</td>
<td>0.73*** (−)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate</td>
<td>1.22** (+)</td>
<td>1.13* (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Controls: Social Movement Diffusion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance from Wall Street Zuccotti Park, statute miles</td>
<td>1.00* (+)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance to Nearest Neighboring Occupy site, statute miles</td>
<td>1.00*** (−)</td>
<td>1.00*** (−)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Encampments Established on Previous Day</td>
<td>1.01* (+)</td>
<td>1.01** (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative Number of Encampments as of Previous Day</td>
<td>1.00*** (+)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 10th Call for Action on Previous Day</td>
<td>1.22* (+)</td>
<td>1.22* (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 15th Call for Action on Previous Day</td>
<td>1.86*** (+)</td>
<td>1.69*** (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Encampments Closed on Previous Day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative Number of Encampments Closed as of Previous Day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wall Street Still Encamped at Zuccotti Park</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Controls: Community</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location of Occupy Site is State Capital</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>1.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Controls: Encampment Conditions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weather (Mean Temperature)</td>
<td>0.99** (−)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weather (Precipitation)</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive-Negative Frame Imbalance</td>
<td>10.20*** (+)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Conflict Frames</td>
<td>1.13*** (+)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N (Unit of Analysis: Organization-Days)</strong></td>
<td>72,281</td>
<td>72,281</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: For significant coefficient estimates, the sign of the z-statistic is given in parentheses. (+) indicates that the variable increases the hazard of the DV event occurring; (−) indicates that the variable decreases the hazard of the DV event occurring.

† p < 0.10     * p < 0.05     ** p < 0.01     *** p < 0.001
Appendix A. Data, Procedures, and Measures

The Occupy movement, which began in 2011, provides an ideal context for examining media influence on institutional entrepreneurs for two reasons. First, while Occupy began as the single protest “Occupy Wall Street” on September 17, 2011, the Occupy message quickly diffused, seeding hundreds of local organizations working as part of the overall social movement. The establishment of further protest sites, with similar objectives and organizational structures, across the United States and the world (Yardley, 2011) represented examples of institutional entrepreneurship, in that they were comprised of individuals who sought to effect institutional change (Lowenstein, 2011). Second, the Occupy tactic of disruptive, unlawful encampment also diffused, yet it did so differentially. Some local Occupy sites created encampments, yet many others did not. These encampments maintained a precarious implicit agreement with local authorities, many of whom allowed the encampments to persist despite violating trespassing and other laws. U.S. law guarantees the right to assemble, petition, and protest; however, occupying a property, entering property with intent to interfere, or refusing to leave public property during hours it is regularly closed after being asked to leave constitutes criminal trespass under state laws. As a result, thousands of Occupy encampment participants were arrested and jailed, with some formally convicted and sentenced to jail terms. We limited our scope to Occupy sites in the United States to minimize confounding variance arising from differences in national laws concerning press, speech, association, and assembly liberties (Freedom House, 2011).

We began our study with a list of all U.S. Occupy sites which was assembled using information from all available media, internet sources, and message boards. We continued this search, examining progressively more directories and sources, until we found that each new source contained no Occupy sites that we had not previously identified from multiple earlier sources. Thus, we assembled a list of 459 U.S. Occupy sites. Of these, 23 were eliminated because they referred to a broad geographical area containing other Occupy sites (e.g., Occupy Minnesota), were duplicates

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1 Resources included occupylist.org, directory.Occupy.net, newspapers, and lists of satellite Occupy movements. Some of these sources are now defunct.
of existing Occupy sites (e.g., misspellings, abbreviations, or variations in naming), or their existence could not be independently verified. This resulted in 436 distinct Occupy sites in the United States. Sites included major metropolitan cities (New York, Boston, Denver), smaller cities under one million in population (Oakland, Boise, Detroit), and other towns of under 100,000 in population (Sioux City, IA; St. Joseph, MO; Bozeman, MT).

Our event history analysis requires the specification of a pair of dependent variables for each outcome of interest: a binary measure of whether an event occurred and a duration until the event occurred. In our study, we were interested in both encampment, as well as forced departure (eviction of the encampment), thus, we have two pairs of variables. Our first dependent variable, *encampment*, was assigned a value of 1 if an encampment was formed by a given Occupy site at any point during our sampling frame and a value of 0 if no encampment was formed (e.g., the site involved protests but no encampment). Because encampments are not protected speech or protest, (e.g., Bray et al., 2011), encampment is a more disruptive action for institutional entrepreneurs to attempt. Among the 436 sites we identified, 165 established encampments, while the remaining 271 held meetings and protested but never encamped. Our second dependent variable, *days to encampment*, was calculated as the number of days from the date each frame was articulated to the date when the site’s encampment was formed, if the Occupy site ultimately formed an encampment. For the sites that did not form encampments, we count the days at risk for encampment through the date when the last encampment was verified to have ended, May 2012. In total, we examine up to 250 days of media coverage for each possible encampment, beginning from September 17, 2011.

Our pair of dependent variables to model the role of media on when encampments were evicted (the speed of institutional counteraction against institutional entrepreneurs) were operationalized similarly. We operationalized the speed of counteraction as the timing of Occupy encampments’ forced departure from their initial location. Thus, our third dependent variable, *forced departure*, was assigned a value of 1 if an encampment was shut down by government representatives at any point during our sampling frame and a value of 0 if it was not. The forced departure of an encampment at an initial location was frequently due to either a local government
mandate that the encampment be disassembled, or a mandate that the encampment be relocated. Our final dependent variable, *days to forced departure*, was measured as the number of days from the day each frame was articulated and the date on which the initial encampment was moved or dissolved.